Alethea identified a network of X accounts assessed as a subset of Russia’s broader network of accounts used in ongoing influence operation efforts, including those seeking to impact the 2024 Presidential Election. 

While investigating this network, Alethea observed a shift in the behavior of some accounts, potentially reacting to the September 4, 2024, DOJ affidavit which implicates Social Design Agency—a Russian firm suspected of operating at the behest of the Russian government—in operating the influence campaign known as Doppelgänger, known for its use of cloned websites of legitimate news outlets. This shift included faked claims by prominent disinformation experts, including Eliot Higgins, founder of Bellingcat, and Christo Grozev, the former lead Russia investigator at Bellingcat. Often, this apparent new effort to cast doubt on Russia’s involvement in these influence campaigns shifted the blame to Ukraine—who relies on democracies for financial and geopolitical support and is often itself a target of the campaign. 

Background: Alethea consistently tracks Russian influence operations as part of its ongoing effort to provide insight into risks in the online information environment. The network Alethea identified in this investigation consists of 77 accounts on X that posted 113 original, often multimedia, posts. At least 60 of these accounts both posted and amplified network content, collectively sharing  9,000 quote posts of other assets’ content. Recently, the network engaged at least 420 additional accounts that were solely used to amplify content through reposts. In many cases, Alethea observed that some content was shared on Telegram prior to the content being posted on X.  As detailed in Alethea’s March 2024 report, Invisible Ink, Russian attempts to influence elections have shifted from dividing democracies to being almost singularly focused on electing candidates that are likely to stop supporting Ukraine, or to push populations away from supporting foreign aid to Ukraine. This is evident globally, including in the United States. 

Why it matters: Russian efforts to mischaracterize expert analysis of its malign activity, particularly those including the names given to these operations by researchers, is a deflection tactic not yet documented in analyses of related influence operations. Alethea has dubbed this approach “Stormkiller,” based on the Microsoft “Storm” nomenclature used for tracking Doppelgänger-related groups, and the network’s apparent shift to posting content with the goal of “killing” the DOJ’s allegations. 

Alethea has otherwise observed this network spreading narratives denigrating U.S. Vice President Harris, NATO, Ukraine, and other key international organizations and alliances. While the network continues to target Ukraine and Vice President Harris—often with content that contains racist and misogynist narratives—the shift since September 4 suggests that influence operations have assumed a new focus: deflecting the blame for their foreign influence operations targeting the U.S. and Europe. 

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